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This paper analyses the impact of violent conflict on economic growth using micro-level data 
from Indonesia. We compile a panel dataset at district level for the period 2002-2008, and 
disentangle the overall negative economic effect of violent conflict into its sectoral 
components. Our results reveal substantial differences across sectors, with the most 
detrimental impact evident in manufacturing industries and the service sectors. Further, the 
short-run impacts on growth appear to be only temporal, and some evidence for the ‘phoenix 
effect’ in the early post-conflict period is found. The construction sector, in particular, 
recovers soon once conflict ends, while manufacturing industries and the finance sector 
appear especially reliant on a lasting peace. A series of alternative specifications confirm the 
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Indonesia, the largest and most populous Southeast Asian nation, emerged with a new 
democratic government following the 1998 fall of President Suharto. The collapse of 
Suharto’s long and authoritarian New Order regime was followed by a wave of high-profile 
violence, with separatist conflicts in Aceh and East Timor, religious conflicts in Maluku and 
Sulawesi, and ethnic conflicts in Kalimantan and Nusa Tenggara Timur. One decade after the 
end of the New Order, some progress in restoring peace and political stability has been 
achieved and Indonesia is moving toward a more stable democratic government while the 
number of headline-making conflicts has sharply decreased. 
This paper employs exceptionally detailed data sources to analyze the potentially varying 
effects of violent conflict on different areas of the Indonesian economy. While existing 
empirical evidence on the conflict-growth nexus mostly comes from cross-country studies and 
is based on aggregate GDP data, our approach allows going beyond the (well-known) overall 
negative impact of war. For this purpose, we combine district-level data on GDP composition 
with nationwide information on conflict occurrence in 2002, 2005, and 2008.  
The panel analysis provides important insights into sector-specific vulnerabilities during 
violent conflict and in the early recovery phase. We find, first, that activities depending on 
capital and transactions are particularly affected by violent conflict. Second, conflict-related 
declines in economic growth are of temporary nature, with some areas of the economy 
recovering faster than others once conflict ends. Third, the results confirm that the scale of the 
economic downturn depends on the intensity and type of violence, rather than the mere 
existence of mostly non-violent or low intensity conflicts. Finally, spillover effects from 
violence in neighboring regions are less clear and appear to only affect transaction-intensive 
industries, most notably transport industries and financial services.  
The paper is structured as follows. The next section reviews the existing literature on growth 
and violence, discusses potential transmission channels from violence to growth, and derives 
some hypotheses on the sector-specific impacts of violent conflict. We then provide 
background information to the conflicts under consideration, present the data, and discuss our 
estimation strategy. This is followed by some descriptive statistics and the presentation of the 





Explaining differences in economic growth and, more generally, in income levels across 
countries and over time is one of the most important, although one of the more difficult, tasks 
in economic research. The existing literature is vast and constantly amended by new 
contributions to both theory and empirics. Solow’s 1956 model is still the major theoretical 
reference and basic workhorse of growth empirics. Based on a neoclassical production 
function, long-run per capita incomes in this model depend on savings and population growth 
rates as well as technological progress. Countries with similar characteristics in this respect 
are expected to converge to a common steady state, with only transitory income differences 
between these countries.  
This neoclassical theory of convergence is challenged by real world divergent growth 
experiences. The permanent income differences between countries are attributed to structural 
and institutional heterogeneities with empirical work finding a wide range of economic, 
political, social and geographical factors that impact economic growth.
1 The validity of this 
large amount of work, however, with a variety of different and sometimes opposing results, is 
increasingly called into question. Inter alia, criticism includes arbitrary model specifications 
without theoretical underpinning, issues of data comparability, inappropriate econometric 
methodologies, limitations of cross-country analyses, and insufficient treatment of 
endogenous explanatory variables (see e.g. Bosworth and Collins, 2003). Some work tries to 
account for these shortcomings, with Durlauf et al. (2005) identifying a set of explanatory 
variables consistently found to be related to economic growth. While the focus of this study is 
on violent conflict rather than on the growth process as such, cross-country evidence on these 
factors is briefly reviewed.  
Today, scholars widely agree on the importance of institutional settings for economic 
development. Acemoglu et al. (2004) stress the role of economic institutions, such as well-
defined property rights and the presence of functioning markets for economic outcomes. The 
quality of both economic and political institutions, as well as the impact these have on 
economic growth, is assessed in a wide range of studies. Acemoglu et al. (2001), for instance, 
tackle concerns of endogeneity by using the mortality of colonial settlers as an instrument for 
                                                 
1 Durlauf et al. (2005) report a total of 145 potential determinants of economic growth that are studied in the 
literature. 
 
3today’s institutional quality and confirm a decisive impact on growth.  
Besides historical legacies, ethnic diversity is often seen as another explanation for cross-
country differences in the effectiveness of public policies. Heterogeneous preferences across 
ethnic groups are likely to impede agreement on policy decisions and result in lower spending 
on public goods (Alesina et al. 1999). Sound government policy thereby plays a particularly 
decisive role in the area of infrastructure. Efficient investment, for example in 
telecommunications, transport, water or energy systems, facilitates economic activity and is 
found to contribute substantially to GDP growth (Esfahani and Ramírez, 2003).  
The relationship between education and economic growth is more contested. While a positive 
link between individual education and income is confirmed by a large body of microeconomic 
studies (see e.g. Psacharapoulos and Patrinos, 2004), cross-country evidence is mixed. Recent 
macro-level analyses on the impact of educational attainment on economic growth fail to 
establish a significant relationship (see Easterly and Levine (2001) for a discussion). Potential 
explanations include differences between social and private returns to education, 
measurement errors and limited data comparability.  
Other country characteristics that are identified as fundamental growth determinants, such as 
climatic conditions (Masters and McMillan, 2001), geographic isolation (Frankel and Romer, 
1999), or culture and religion (Barro and McCleary, 2003), are rather time-invariant and can 
barely be influenced, at least in the short term. In general, cross-country studies tend to focus 
on the factors that drive long term growth and rarely provide for short term interventions. A 
distinction between short term growth dynamics and long term equilibrium effects could 
therefore add valuable insights for policy makers (Rao and Corray, 2009).  
Evidence from cross-country studies often also suffers from restrictive assumptions. Pooling 
across countries implicitly assumes a universal growth process and homogeneous growth 
parameters, i.e. identical underlying production functions and technological improvements. 
With most samples, however, consisting of very heterogeneous countries at different stages of 
development and with diverse economic structures, cross-country parameter estimates, at best, 
display inter-country averages, but tell little about the evolution of growth for individual 
countries (Bos et al., 2010).  
Therefore, case studies using country specific time series or panel data are more appropriate 
for analyzing country specific growth experiences. Common institutional and legal 
frameworks plus the consistency of data sources within individual countries contribute to a 
higher comparability of growth processes. Disaggregated GDP data often enables 
 
4investigation into inter-industry differences. Empirical research in this field has focused, inter 
alia, on the determinants of growth rates in specific sectors, including, among others, Sapio 
and Thoma (2006) on US manufacturing, and Bosma, Stam and Schutjens (2010) on Dutch 
manufacturing and services; as well as the contribution of specific sectors to overall economic 
development, including Balaguer and Cantavella-Jordá (2002) on Spanish tourism. 
Evidence from developing countries is relatively scarce. For Indonesia, Garcia and 
Soelistianingsih (1998) analyze the evolution of provincial incomes under the New Order 
regime and find that poorer provinces catch up, especially through investments in human 
capital. Using district-level data for the period 1993-2005, McCulloch and Sjahrir (2008) 
confirm the hypothesis of relative convergence and the positive growth impact of a better 
educated labor force. None of these studies accounts for the effects of violent conflict on the 
local economy. 
 
Impact of Violent Conflict on Growth 
Violent conflicts affect economic outcomes mainly through the destruction of human and 
physical capital, shifts in public spending and private investment, as well as the disruption of 
economic activities and social life (see Blattman and Miguel (2010) for a summary). The 
specific impacts depend on each conflict’s singular characteristics: it is not just the type of 
conflict, but also its intensity, duration, and geographical spread that shapes its economic 
consequences. We also expect that violent conflicts affect individual economic sectors 
differently, given differing characteristics. 
Quantitative evidence on the overall growth effect of conflicts mostly comes from cross-
country datasets. Collier’s (1999) analysis establishes a substantially negative link between 
civil war duration and economic growth. His approach, however, is criticized for not 
considering variations in the scale and scope of conflict. Imai and Weinstein (2000) stress the 
importance of the geographical spread of conflicts, and conclude that wide-spread civil wars 
affect economic growth five times more than conflicts fought in small parts of the country. 
Bodea and Elbadawi (2008) distinguish different levels of political violence and find 
particularly negative growth impacts for civil wars, relative to the less severe effects resulting 
from riots or coups. Consistent with this, Koubi (2005) finds that the impact that civil war has 
on long-run economic growth to be proportional to conflict severity in terms of conflict-
related human losses.  
 
5Single country evidence on the growth impact of violence is relatively scarce. Abadie and 
Gardeazabal (2003) show a negative impact of the ETA terrorist conflict on economic growth 
in the Basque Country. Dependent on the intensity of terrorism, Basque per capita GDP 
declined, on average, by 10 percentage points relative to other Spanish regions. Lopez and 
Wodon (2005) use time series data to estimate the impact of the 1994 genocide on the 
evolution of Rwanda’s per capita GDP. Based on outlier detection and correction, their results 
indicate a significant loss in GDP in the short term, though no impact is found on post-
genocide growth rates. Arunatilake et al. (2001) assess the direct and indirect costs of the Sri 
Lankan civil war between 1983 and 1996, with their estimates of total costs adding up to 
twice the country’s 1996 GDP.  
Existing literature on Indonesian conflicts mostly deals with the socioeconomic determinants 
of violent conflict and not with its consequences (Tadjoedin and Murshed, 2007). Barron, 
Kaiser and Pradhan (2009) use the 2003 PODES village dataset to analyze correlations of 
local violent conflicts with several socioeconomic variables, including unemployment, 
inequality, and natural disasters. Anecdotal evidence reveals that the economic potential of 
conflict prone areas is not fully realized due to conflicts. Most production in these areas is 
disrupted and those who trying to export products face barriers such as illegal taxes or fees 
imposed by civil servants and military personnel (Mawardi, 2006). 
Often, the economic impact of violent conflicts is not limited to the conflict area as the impact 
spills over to neighboring regions and countries. Refugee flows increase labor supply and 
reduce per capita incomes, trade flows are disrupted, government spending is diverted to non-
productive security measures, and foreign direct investments might be shifted away from 
entire regions that are perceived as insecure. Murdoch and Sandler’s (2002) analysis of spatial 
dispersion finds significant negative growth impacts of civil wars for contiguous neighbors, 
especially in the short term. Using different data and methodology, De Groot (2010) confirms 
the negative economic effects of violent conflict for direct neighbors, but finds positive 
spillovers for non-contiguous areas.  
The overall negative effects of violent conflict on economic development are hence well 
documented and seem shaped by the conflict’s type, duration, and geographical spread. 
However, our understanding of, and especially empirical evidence on, the transmission 
mechanisms from conflict to growth remain limited. In what follows, we characterize the 
drivers of the economic downturn in conflict-ridden societies and present the existing 
evidence on the varying effects of conflict across economic activities. 
 
6 
Transmission Channels from Conflict to Growth 
First and foremost, the level and growth rate of the capital stock are negatively affected by 
conflict-related damage and reduced investment. The destruction or dislocation of production 
facilities and key infrastructure, most notably in the areas of transportation, communication 
and energy, impedes economic activity. Private agents become involved in dissaving and 
portfolio substitution as perceived risk increases and as investments in regions not affected by 
violent conflict offer higher relative returns with lower risk. Government spending on 
productive activities is likely to decrease due to an eroding tax base and hampered tax 
administration on the one hand, and the diversion of public funds to military and security 
expenditures on the other. Poor macroeconomic policy, with rising budget deficits and 
increasing inflation, tends to further hamper economic growth. 
Empirical work mostly focuses on changes in public and private investment. Svensson (1998), 
for instance, identifies a potential channel from political instability and associated weak 
property rights to reduced private investment. A negative impact of political violence on 
private savings and domestic investments is also found by Fielding (2000, 2004) in his 
analyses of the macroeconomic impacts of the Israeli Intifada. Gupta et al. (2004) reveal 
adverse effects of armed conflict on tax revenues and public investments: higher government 
spending on defense is associated with macroeconomic instability and a diversion of 
resources away from socially and economically productive sectors. Knight et al. (1996) relate 
this growth-retarding impact of rising military expenditures to negative effects on capital 
formation and resource allocation. Finally, Imai and Weinstein (2000) conclude that 
reductions in private investments affect economic growth much more than downturns in 
public investment. 
Assessing the growth impact of other conflict phenomena, such as the loss of human capital 
or changes in economic activities, is more difficult. People living in conflict zones face 
increased risks of being injured or killed. The better off (and better educated) are more likely 
to flee to neighboring regions or countries. In the longer term, human capital accumulation is 
affected by the destruction of educational infrastructure, the absence of teachers, and lower 
government spending on education during times of war. The negative long term consequences 




In the short term, conflict-related deaths and injuries, emigration, displacement, and forced 
conscription reduce the available labor force and are likely to affect productivity. However, 
systematic empirical evidence on the impact of violent conflict on labor markets hardly exists. 
One exception is the assessment by Arunatilake et al. (2001) of the costs of the civil war in 
Sri Lanka. Their estimates of the costs related to displacement and lost human capital sum up 
to around five percent of the estimated total costs of war. 
More is known about conflict-related distortions of economic behavior, i.e. impacts on 
economic activity and market exchange. Heightened insecurity, threatened property rights, 
and the suppression of civil liberties result in an unsafe business environment. Transaction 
costs increase, trust deteriorates, economic activities are disrupted and market exchange is 
limited in war-torn societies. Micro-level studies document people’s retreat into less 
vulnerable economic activities in conflict regions. Deininger (2003), for example, shows that 
civil strife in Uganda during the 1990s reduced off-farm investments and led to a shift toward 
subsistence farming with less market integration. Similarly, Verpoorten (2009) finds that the 
Rwandan households most affected by violence were prevented from selling their cattle, the 
usual response to adverse income shocks, due to unsafe roads and the related inaccessibility of 
markets.  
Further, violent conflict hampers not only domestic exchange, but international trade flows as 
well. Blomberg and Hess (2006) find that global trade flows are impeded to a greater extent 
by violent conflicts than by traditional tariff barriers. According to their estimates, bilateral 
trade flows for conflict-affected countries decline by up to 40 percent. The strongly negative 
impact of war on international trade is confirmed by Glick and Taylor’s (2005) analysis 
covering 1870-1997. 
 
Sector-specific Evidence and Expectations 
Given the substantial and diverse effects of violent conflict, we expect varying degrees of 
vulnerability across different economic sectors. Economic activities that are strategically 
                                                 
2 Ghobarah et al. (2003) examine the impact of civil wars on public health; Lai and Thyne’s (2007) cross-country 
study finds devastating war effects on educational systems. Growing evidence on the human capital costs of 
violent conflict is also available at the micro-level; see Households in Conflict Network, http://www.hicn.org, 
for recent studies.  
 
8important to the belligerent parties might also become direct targets, such as relevant 
production facilities or the transportation and logistics sectors. Empirical evidence on these 
sector-specific effects of violent conflict is generally rare and comes mostly from single-
sector case studies, as disaggregated growth measures from war-torn economies are often not 
available. Collier (1999) argues that those activities, which supply or are intensive in either 
capital or transactions, are particularly vulnerable. Sectors less dependent on capital and 
transactions should be relatively less affected, which applies to and is confirmed by the 
observed rise in subsistence agricultural activities in times of conflict.  
The overall impact of conflict on primary sector growth, however, seems ambiguous. 
Destroyed assets, landmine contamination, as well as a shortage of labor and capital are likely 
to impede agricultural development. The production of (cash) crops and livestock requires 
future investments and is expected to decline due to shortened planning horizons for farmers. 
Dramatic losses of livestock are documented for several civil wars.
3 Teodosijević (2003) 
compares growth rates of agricultural production in 38 conflict-affected countries and finds 
substantially lower outcomes during violent conflict in comparison with the pre-war period. 
Generally, concerns of endogenous economic outcomes with respect to violent conflict 
particularly apply to the primary sector. Being central to many societies in the developing 
world, environmental scarcities and food insecurities are among the main triggers of violent 
conflicts. Prospects for agricultural development might therefore be structurally lower in 
conflict-prone regions.  
Similarly, the link between natural resource wealth and violent conflict is likely to run both 
ways. Scholars find that the production of oil and ‘lootable resources’, such as gemstones and 
drugs, to be associated with conflict incidence, specifically separatist conflicts (see Ross 
(2004) for a summary). Violent conflicts, in turn, tend to increase economic dependency on 
natural resources: while other sectors of the economy collapse, natural resources are immobile 
and represent an often important source of revenue for governments and/or rebels. Official 
growth rates of the mineral sector then depend on the legal status of the profiteer and the 
perceived legitimacy of extraction. 
Turning to the industrial sector and applying Collier’s (1999) concept of war vulnerability, we 
expect manufacturing and construction industries to be particularly affected. Manufacturing is 
                                                 
3 Brück (1997) estimates a loss of 80% of the cattle stock in the Mozambican civil war. Similar devastation is 
found for Uganda (Annan, Blattman and Horton, 2006) and Rwanda (FAO, 1997). 
 
9often intensive in both physical and human capital, requires complex coordination with 
contractors and vendors, and is therefore especially reliant on the institutional environment. In 
his analysis of conflict-ridden developing countries, Depetris Chauvin and Rohner (2009) 
points to negative effects of war for exporting industries due to conflict-related trade barriers. 
The collapse of the domestic demand for investment goods, both from state and private 
agents, would also, and in particular, affect the construction sector. 
The service sector, finally, encompasses a broad range of economic activities, ranging from 
traditional services – house cleaning, food services, barber shops, and the like – to trade, 
transport, tourism, the social sector, as well as finance and business services. Finance is 
expected to suffer from capital flight and falling demand for transactions, with the latter also 
applying to trade and transport industries. Likewise, tourism is particularly sensitive to violent 
events: Neumayer’s (2004) cross-country analysis reveals strong negative impacts of political 
violence on tourist arrivals, with even stronger impacts in the long term compared to 
contemporaneous effects.  
Increasing military expenditures during violent conflict involve shifts in government spending 
often to the detriment of social services. Traditional services tend to be location-specific and 
are less dependent on physical capital and long term investments. Assumed to be relatively 
invulnerable to war, such local services might nevertheless suffer from the overall economic 
decline. Generally, the lack of employment opportunities in conflict times often leads to an 
increase in informal businesses. These activities, such as petty trade, peddling work, or the 
selling of food are difficult to capture in official statistics. 
One important issue omitted so far is the dynamic aspect of violent conflict, i.e. varying 
economic impacts at different stages of conflict. Disregarding conflict intensity, the negative 
shock related to the outbreak of violence might have a more detrimental growth impact than 
an ongoing conflict. Cerra and Saxena (2008), for instance, show that the initial economic 
decline in countries affected by civil war is substantial, but they expect at least partial 
recovery of output levels after a relatively short period of time. Contrary to the convergence 
predictions of neoclassical growth models, however, a complete catch-up to pre-war levels in 
the post-conflict period is not observed.  
Building on the Phoenix factor theory (Organski and Kugler, 1977), which refers to the post-
conflict restoration of economic activities, we still expect positive prospects for economic 
growth in the recovery process. Efforts of reconstruction, for instance, might spark a 
construction boom once violence and insecurity decline (Collier, 2009). Recovery of other 
 
10areas of the economy, such as the tourism industry or the financial sector, might be more 
reliant on the rebuilding of trust and a peaceful environment, which takes time. 
 
CONFLICT AND DATA DESCRIPTION  
Background to the Violence 
Before turning to the data used to analyze the sector-specific effects of violent conflict in the 
early years of the post-Suharto era, we briefly characterize the most severe conflicts of that 
era. Most international attention is paid to the conflict between the Free Aceh Movement 
(GAM) rebels in Aceh and the Indonesian government (see Reid (2006) for an in-depth 
analysis of the conflict). This separatism fight began with GAM’s declaration of an 
independent Aceh in 1976 and lasted for almost 30 years, with an estimated 12,000 killed 
during the conflict. As a province rich in oil and gas, with a long history of independence and 
a regional specific Muslim character, Acehnese aspirations for political autonomy were based 
on economic as well as historical and religious motivation. The New Order regime under 
Suharto responded to the secessionist movement with increasingly repressive measures, while 
at the same time taking a lion’s share of the province’s significant revenues from oil and gas.  
The fall of Suharto in 1998 raised hope for an end to the conflict and peace talks between the 
democratically elected Indonesian Government and GAM were initiated with  special 
autonomy status offered to the province. Concurrently, fighting between GAM rebels and the 
Indonesian military continued, and even intensified between 1999 and 2002, resulting in a 
large death toll, especially among civilians. In May 2003, when peace talks finally failed, the 
Indonesian government imposed martial law in Aceh and started a major military offensive to 
ultimately weaken the rebel movement.  
Growing battle fatigue among GAM members combined with the newly elected President 
Yudhoyono’s and Vice President Kalla’s political will to end the conflict contributed to a 
tentative resumption of the peace process in late 2004. It was in this context that Aceh was hit 
by the devastating tsunami in late December 2004. It struck much of the western and northern 
coast of the province. Both belligerent sides agreed to cease hostilities in order to facilitate the 
recovery process, and the subsequent peace talks resulted in the Helsinki peace agreement in 
August 2005. Since then, Aceh has entered a period of relative peace. 
The separatist movement in Aceh is not been the only post-Suharto conflict that Indonesia has 
dealt with. Suppressed by the New Order’s military might, long-simmering tensions finally 
 
11broke out into overt conflict and destructive violence during the country’s transition to 
democracy and decentralization. While conflicts occurred throughout the archipelago, some 
regions were particularly affected by violence.  
In the provinces of Maluku and North Maluku, tensions between religious and migrant groups 
caused over 7,000 deaths between 1999 and 2002 (see Brown et al. (2005) for a conflict 
overview). Populated by Muslims and Christians in approximately equal proportion, historical 
inequalities stemmed from preferential treatment of Christians during Dutch colonialism. The 
political, social, and economic dominance of Christians, however, began to erode under the 
Islamization policies during the last decade of the New Order regime, when Muslims were 
increasingly appointed to key positions in the civil service. Continued influx of mostly 
Muslim migrants from Java and Sulawesi further challenged the fragile ethno-religious 
balance, and resulting tensions over communal land and resources were aggravated by the 
1997 economic crisis.  
In January 1999, a fight between an Ambonese Christian bus driver and an immigrant Muslim 
triggered a period of wide-spread inter-communal violence that quickly spread to other parts 
of the province. The initial disinterest, or even active involvement, of security forces 
contributed to an escalation of violence, and the conflict further intensified in mid-2000, when 
several thousand fighters of the newly-founded Islamic militia organization Laksar Jihad 
entered the region to support the Muslim cause. The central government’s build-up of security 
forces along with Vice President Kalla’s efforts to mediate peace resulted in the Malino II 
peace agreements in February 2002. While this peace is fragile and occasional violence 
continues, conflict is considerably less intense (Varshney et al., 2009). 
Comparable patterns of violence evolved in Sulawesi, located to the west of the Maluku 
islands, and particularly in the province of Central Sulawesi. For similar reasons,
4 tensions 
between Christians and Muslims increased during the 1990s, gaving way to severe sectarian 
violence in the post-Suharto period, with an estimated 1,000 killed and 100,000 displaced (see 
e.g. Human Rights Watch (2002) for a conflict overview). With the absence of effective 
security forces and functioning legal institutions, the conflict went through different phases 
and intensified further with the arrival of Laskar Jihad fighters in mid-2001. The increased 
                                                 
4 Similarities in the underlying causes of the violence in the Moluccas and in Central Sulawesi include historical 
socio-economic imbalances, shifts in local power from Christians to Muslims as a result of Suharto’s ‘Islamic 
Turn’ in the 1990s, spontaneous and government-led in-migration of Muslims mainly from South Sulawesi and 
Java, as well economic uncertainty in the wake of the 1997 economic crisis. 
 
12presence of police and military personnel combined with the central government’s efforts to 
mitigate the conflict finally led to the Malino peace declaration in December 2001. The 
number of communal clashes has since declined substantially; incidents of violence, however, 
still sporadically occur and peace remains vulnerable.  
Conflicts reported outside these areas are spread across the archipelago, with more 
pronounced levels of violence in the Nusa Tenggara islands, parts of Java and Central 
Sumatra, as well as Papua. Underlying causes of these low intensity conflicts appear to be 
manifold and related to local circumstances (Barron et al., 2009). Generally, a lack of 
effective institutions and mechanisms of dispute resolution, local power struggles in the 
process of decentralization, and conflicts related to land ownership and usage seem to be the 
most prominent drivers of communal violence in Indonesia. 
 
Growth Data 
For the empirical analysis looking at the economic consequences of these conflicts, we draw 
on two distinct data sources. Data on economic growth is provided by the Central Bureau of 
Statistics, Badan Pusat Statistik (BPS). The Gross Regional Domestic Product (GRDP) data 
are disaggregated at district
5 and sectoral level. Table I in the Appendix provides an overview 
of the different sectors, sub-sectors, and sub-categories. We distinguish between the primary, 
secondary, and tertiary sector, as well as additionally disaggregating into the following nine 
sub-sectors: agriculture, mining, manufacturing, energy, construction, commerce, transport 
and communication, finance, and other services. For each category, we calculate the annual 
rate of GDP growth based on the reported value added. In order to control for economic 
spillover effects, we also calculate the average weighted growth rate in neighboring districts 
in the current and preceding year.
6 Apart from five missing observations,
7 a balanced panel is 
available.  
It is important to note that the GDP figures are compiled separately by the BPS offices at 
national, regional, and district levels, which is likely to result in varying qualities of the data 
provided. Moreover, the BPS system does not guarantee that district and provincial figures 
                                                 
5 As of 2008, Indonesia is divided into 33 provinces, which are further divided into a total of 456 districts. 
6 Districts are considered “neighboring” when sharing a common land border.  
7 Control variables are not available from the district of Nias (North Sumatra). GDP growth rates can not be 
calculated for the newly founded districts of Kota Bengkulu (Bengkulu) and Kota Bau-Bau (South East 
Sulawesi) for 2002, as GDP data for 2001 is not available. 
 
13add up to provincial and national aggregates, respectively. Indeed, the sum of district GRDP 
deviates, on average, by around three percent from the published provincial GRDP, with the 
sum of district GRDP equaling 99 percent of the summed provincial GRDP figures. As these 
deviations appear random across both regions affected and not affected by conflict, these 
weaknesses in the data are unlikely to bias the analysis.  
Still, in order to reduce noise in the data, we correct a few observations where the reported 
production values deviate extremely from the overall trend. As these extreme growth rates are 
distributed randomly across districts and sectors,
8 correction of extreme sub-sectoral growth 
rates should not involve systematic distortions of the data. We adjust “outliers” (growth rates 
larger than 50 percent) in the following way: a) in cases where the current GDP value deviates 
extremely from the general trend, the average annual growth rate from the previous two years 
is used; b) sub-sectors with growth rates greater than 50 percent are excluded from the 
calculation of sectoral (agriculture, industry, services) and overall growth rates. This 
procedure results in the adjustment of 99 sub-sectoral growth rates in total, which corresponds 
to less than one percent of the whole sample. Table 1a provides descriptive statistics for the 
variables of economic growth. For robustness, we also run the analysis with the original data. 
 
PODES Data 
Control and conflict variables are derived from the Village Potential Statistics Survey 
(Potensi Desa or PODES), a village-level census that is conducted three times per decade. 
Also administered by BPS, PODES collects socio-economic information from all 69,000 
Indonesian rural villages and urban neighborhoods. The survey is based on responses of the 
village heads and includes a wide range of indicators, ranging from population characteristics 
to infrastructure, economic activities, and social life.  
We use three sequential rounds of PODES (2003, 2006, 2008), collected in August 2002, in 
April 2005, and between April and May 2008, respectively, and aggregate the data at district 
level, which is the administrative level for which economic growth data is available. A 
challenge in constructing the database arises from Indonesia’s post-Suharto decentralization 
legislation and the related formation of new districts. This process, known as pemekaran, led 
to an increase in the number of districts, going from 376 in 2002, to 438 in 2005, and 465 in 
                                                 
8 For example, a district with very high reported growth in the transport sector shows moderate growth rates in 
all other sectors. 
 
142008. We therefore realign the 2005 and 2008 data to match the 2002 district borders in order 
to achieve a uniform dataset of 376 districts throughout.  
While some of the standard controls in cross-country growth regressions are not available at 
district level,
9 the detailed village-level information provided by the PODES data allows us to 
obtain a valid set of proxy variables. We use the share of villages with electricity and the 
average educational attainment of village heads in a district to proxy for infrastructure 
development and institutional quality, respectively. Further explanatory variables are the rate 
of population growth, ethnic diversity, and natural disaster events. To control for the 
devastating impact of the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami that hit the northern parts of Sumatra, 
we also include an indicator of tsunami-related physical destruction (UNORC, 2005). Basic 
descriptive statistics for the control variables are presented in Table 1b. 
In 2003 PODES, a section on conflict has been included for the first time. The village heads 
report,  inter alia, on incidences of conflict in the previous year, the number of conflict 
fatalities, the amount of conflict-related material damage, and whether the conflict is resolved 
or is still ongoing. Based on this information, a series of conflict variables at district level is 
derived. In order to obtain comparable indicators of conflict intensity, fatalities and material 
damage are set in proportion to the district’s total population and total GDP, respectively. 
Conflict spillover variables are computed by the ratio of the total number of fatalities (total 
amount of material damage) in all neighboring districts to the total population (total GDP) of 
all neighboring districts. Unlike binary indicators used in related cross-country analyses, this 
approach allows for the consideration of the economic impact of conflict intensity in 
neighboring regions.  
Furthermore, we aim to address potentially varying growth effects in different phases of 
violent conflict. However, as the PODES data covers conflict in the respective previous year 
and is conducted three times per decade, the information on the occurrence of violent conflict 
is not continuous. Although this prevents us from understanding the whole course of the 
conflict, village heads do indicate whether conflict is resolved or still ongoing. This 
information allows us to distinguish between active conflicts and observations from an early 
post-conflict situation, and we split the indicators of relative conflict intensity accordingly. 
                                                 
9 For instance, no measure of human capital is included, as data on literacy or school enrolment rates are not 
available for 2008. Given the relatively short time period covered by the analysis, we generally do not expect 
these indicators to change substantially. In fact, the variance decomposition of available literacy data from 2000 
to 2006 reveals low within district variations when compared to variation across districts. 
 
15Table 1c provides descriptive statistics for all conflict variables that we use in the analysis. 
One concern we face is the issue of data reliability. Comparably low levels of conflict 
reported by PODES raise concerns of misreporting by local authorities. When conflict is 
perceived as the failure of local leaders and when respondents have doubts about the purpose 
of the survey, violence might not be accurately reported. Comparisons with other quantitative 
surveys and qualitative fieldwork indeed suggest that conflict is significantly underreported 
by PODES.
10 However, these comparisons also show such underreporting to be of similar 
magnitude across different regions and hence systemic, i.e. not biased by local characteristics. 
PODES data is therefore assumed to provide accurate information on relative levels of 
conflict both across districts and over time. Keeping in mind that the potential underreporting 
would result in an attenuation bias, we expect rather conservative estimates of the economic 
impact of violent conflict. 
 
ECONOMETRIC APPROACH 
Building on standard growth regressions, the starting point of our empirical analysis is the 
following equation: 
 g it = Citα + Xitβ + εit  , (1) 
where git is the total or sectoral growth rate of real GDP in district i and year t, Cit are 
measures of conflict, Xit  is a matrix of other covariates that determine economic growth, and 
εit is the unobservable error term. The coefficient of interest is α, which captures the effects of 
conflict on GDP growth. Previous macro-level studies on the economic impacts of violent 
conflict have in large part relied on pooled OLS estimation (Bozzoli et al., 2008). In this 
setting, however, the underlying assumption of independent and identically distributed errors 
ε is likely to be violated.  
When factors that affect a society’s economic outcomes and its vulnerability to violent 
conflict at the same time are omitted, OLS estimates are inconsistent. Cultural attitudes, for 
instance, are hard to measure, but potentially drive both growth and conflicts. Given the panel 
structure of the data, one way to deal with such unobserved heterogeneity is the introduction 
of district fixed effects (FE) to control for those district characteristics that did not change 
                                                 
10 Barron and Sharpe (2008) monitor conflicts reported in local newspapers in the provinces of East Java and 
Nusa Tenggara Timur (NTT) during the period 2001-2003; Barron et al. (2004) conduct village-level case 
studies in the same provinces for comparison with 2003 PODES. 
 
16over the 2002-2008 period. This captures the underlying cultural values, as well as other time-
invariant or long term, slow changing, growth determinants, such as initial wealth or 
geographic and climatic conditions.  
The inclusion of time dummies further accounts for overall macroeconomic trends that affect 
all districts alike. Therefore, only additional explanatory variables that vary both with district 
and over time need to be included for the analysis of short term and within-district growth 
dynamics. The variance decomposition for both the growth and conflict variables reveals 
larger variations over time (within variation) than across districts (between variation), which 
confirms the accuracy and necessity of the FE model, in particular, for our focus on the role of 
violent conflicts.  
As every empirical investigation of the conflict-growth nexus, we face concerns of reverse 
causality. That is, (low) economic growth is not only a result, but also a potential cause of 
violent conflict, leading to inconsistent parameter estimates. Ideally, we would like to 
instrument for the endogenous variable(s) to disentangle simultaneous causation. Finding 
suitable “instruments”, however, which predict the incidence or even intensity of violent 
conflict and are uncorrelated with the error term, is extremely difficult. Instruments for 
conflict proposed by the literature include agricultural growth, urban population, and tropical 
location (Kang and Meernik, 2005). Further, the size of the population and the geophysical 
environment may considered as potential IV candidates.
11  
All of these instruments seem neither valid nor relevant. While the required exogeneity with 
respect to economic growth is disputable, its explanatory power in predicting violence appears 
even more problematic. The outbreak and the course of violent conflict is, in general, highly 
complex, and attempting to capture these processes with only one or a few proxy variables 
inevitably runs the risk of oversimplification and misframing.
12 As convincing instruments are 
hardly imaginable, we forego the IV approach, and investigate potential reverse causality 
from growth to conflict for the Indonesian context in more detail. 
                                                 
11 Collier and Hoeffler (2004) find population size to be an important determinant of war, with more populous 
countries being more prone to conflict. Fearon and Laitin (2003) stress that mountainous terrain (similar: forest 
coverage) can facilitate civil wars, as rough terrain provides sanctuary to rebels. 
12 Potential reverse effects from growth to conflict are likewise contested. In an innovative approach, Miguel et 
al. (2004) use abrupt declines in rainfall in Sub-Saharan Africa, where economies primarily rely on rain-fed 
agriculture, to instrument for economic growth. While they find a negative impact of economic growth on 
conflict incidence, this result, however, seems not to hold when a more appropriate sub-sample of states with 
conflict on their own territory is used – as opposed to the inclusion of states that send troops to conflicts in other 
states (Jensen and Gleditsch, 2009). 
 
17The underlying reasons for the conflicts in Indonesia at the turn of the millennium are 
multifarious and even vary across the affected regions. While the conflict in Aceh was driven 
by the long quest for (more) independence, the widespread communal violence rose from 
latent tensions related to horizontal inequalities and large-scale migration, the lack of effective 
security and justice institutions, and local-level struggles for economic power in the process 
of decentralization. Economic uncertainties in the wake of the financial crisis certainly 
contributed to the 1999 outbreak of violence, and disappointing economic developments 
thereafter are likely to have affected people’s decision to engage in conflict.  
However, focusing on the 2002 PODES wave, GDP growth seems not to be among the most 
obvious drivers of reported violence: first, the conflicts reported by the village heads represent 
the September 2001 to August 2002 period. The analysis therefore captures the impact of 
conflict on slightly lagged growth. This is especially true for Central Sulawesi and the 
Maluku islands, where increased levels of conflict in 2001 were followed by the Malino peace 
agreements signed in December 2001 and February 2002, respectively.  
Second, current economic growth is unlikely to have significantly influenced the intensity of 
violence in the case of these mostly ongoing conflicts. Rather, high levels of violence in Aceh 
between 1999 and 2002 were related to a brutalization of the conflict aimed at influencing the 
outcomes of the negotiations on autonomy. Intensified clashes between the Indonesian 
military and the GAM were increasingly accompanied by atrocities against civilians. 
Similarly, provocations by the military and the massive arrival of non-local Laskar Jihad 
fighters fueled the intensification of the conflicts in the Maluku islands and Central Sulawesi.  
Hence, conflict intensity and frequency were mainly driven by outside interventions, rather 
than by short-term evolutions of the local economy. While being aware of potential 
distortions due to reverse causality and not claiming conflict to be exogenous to growth, we 
believe that causation in this setting strongly runs from conflict to growth, rather than the 
opposite way. The estimates from the fixed effects regressions are therefore assumed to 




Figure 1 displays the evolution of sectoral and overall GDP growth rates in Indonesia for the 
2001-2008 period. Overall, weighted annual growth appears relatively stable at around five 
 
18percent and increases slightly over time. The service sector, which accounts for 45 percent of 
total GDP in 2008 (see Table I in the Appendix for the sectoral shares of total GDP in 2000 
and 2008), is the main driver of the Indonesian economy with average annual growth rates 
above six percent. Above-average growth rates are also found in the industrial sector, with 
manufacturing being the most important sub-sector and accounting for one quarter of total 
GDP. Relatively low growth is observed for the primary sector. It still accounts for 26 percent 
of total rural production in 2008, with its share only decreasing slowly since 2000. 
Table 2 summarizes the occurrence of conflict over time, as reported by village heads. We 
observe a substantial decrease in both the spread and the intensity of violence in 2005 and 
2008, in comparison with 2002.
13 While 7.2 percent of all villages and neighborhoods report 
conflict in 2002, this figure is halved in 2005 and 2008. Even more striking is the decline in 
conflict-related human losses and physical destruction over time: fatalities and material 
damage in 2005 and 2008 each amount to only approximately one tenth of the 2002 figures, 
which documents Indonesia’s move toward peace in recent years. 
With most of the violence in 2002, we take a closer look at the spatial distribution of violence 
in this year. Figure 2a maps conflict in terms of fatalities per capita, Figure 2b shows conflict 
intensities in terms of material damage relative to district GDP. Conflict-related fatalities are 
relatively concentrated and particularly prevalent in the entire province of Aceh, as well as on 
the islands of Maluku, North Maluku, and Sulawesi. High levels of physical destruction are, 
in addition, observed in the province of Jambi and on the islands of Nusa Tenggara, while 
almost no material damage is reported from the western coast of Aceh.  
Table 3 lists the districts in the sample which are most affected by violence, with observations 
almost exclusively from 2002 and from rural areas. In fact, only ten percent of overall 
fatalities and seven percent of overall material damage are reported from urban districts, 
which make up for around 20 percent of the total population in 2002. The figures also confirm 
the differences in the distribution of human losses and destroyed physical capital: a 
substantial share of those districts with high numbers of fatalities are comparatively little 
affected in terms of physical destruction, and vice versa (correlation between reported 
material destruction and fatalities: 0.66). We use this variation to analyze potentially varied 
economic impacts of different forms of violence. 
                                                 
13 Village heads were asked for incidents of conflict in the previous year, which hence relates to conflicts in the 
periods September 2001-August 2002, June 2004-May 2005, and May/June 2007-April/May 2008. For 
simplicity, we refer to conflicts in 2002, 2005, and 2008, respectively. 
 
19In 2002, the main conflicts in Aceh, Maluku, and Sulawesi account for 89 percent of total 
fatalities (per capita) and 67 percent of total material damage (relative to the district’s GDP) 
reported by village heads. Outside these regions, mostly low intensity forms of violence are 
reported from various parts of the country. However, it has to be noted that the majority of 
districts were hardly affected by any conflict, even in 2002, when 81 percent of the districts 
reported less than five conflict-related fatalities.  
 
Regression Results 
Table 4 presents the FE regression results for the main sectors. The dependent variable is the 
annual growth rate of district GDP. We run separate regressions for agriculture, industry, 
service, and total GDP growth. Some of the control variables are not significant. Unlike 
previous cross-country studies, we fail to find significant impacts of population growth, ethnic 
diversity, or infrastructure development (here: availability of electricity) on economic growth. 
A short survey period, the inclusion of district fixed effects, and the relative invariability of 
the variables in the short term are most likely explanations. A significantly positive impact on 
industry and overall growth is found for average educational attainment of village heads, 
which is supposed to measure improvements in the quality of institutions. 
The two indicators of natural disasters yield mixed results. While the incidence of any kind of 
disaster (earthquake, landslide, and flood) in the years prior to the survey has no significant 
effect,
14 the impact of the 2004 tsunami on subsequent economic growth in the affected 
regions is substantially negative, and particularly so for agriculture. No spillover effects from 
current and recent economic growth in a district’s vicinity are found, and time dummies 
confirm overall greater economic growth in 2005 and 2008, in comparison to 2002.  
We include three indicators of violent conflict: the amount of material damage relative to total 
district GDP, the number of fatalities relative to district population size, and an indicator of 
conflict intensity in neighboring districts.
15 Results indicate a substantial and significantly 
negative impact of conflict-related physical destruction on industry, service, and total GDP 
growth. These estimates translate into an approximate 11 percentage points decrease in 
industrial growth, and a 5 percent age points decrease in service sector growth for the two 
                                                 
14 The lack of significance is likely to be caused by the long, three-year period under consideration, the relatively 
frequent occurrence of floods in Indonesia, and missing information on the scale of destruction. 
15  Here, the conflict spillover variable is based on relative material damage in neighboring districts. An indicator 
based on the number of fatalities is used in later regressions. 
 
20most affected districts of Aceh Timur and Poso (Central Sulawesi). A district affected by the 
average 2002 conflict intensity would, accordingly, expect a decrease in growth by 0.2 
(industry) and 0.1 (services) percent age points, respectively.  
The conflict coefficients for agriculture are small in magnitude and insignificant, which seems 
to confirm the primary sector’s relative immunity to violent conflict. So far, we do not find 
any spillover effects from conflicts in neighboring districts on domestic growth. Likewise, the 
coefficients for conflict fatalities are not significant, with the marginal exception of the 
service sector. Keeping potential multicollinearity among the conflict variables in mind,
16 this 
points to a more detrimental economic impact of physical destruction, compared to human 
losses. Before having a closer look into these varied effects for different forms of violence, we 
turn to the sub-sector regression results to investigate the particular economic effects of 
violent conflict in more detail. 
Table 5 presents similar growth regressions for eight sub-categories of the industry and 
service sectors. The agricultural sector is omitted here, as no further disaggregation is 
available. While the same set of control variables as before are used, we focus on the growth 
effects of conflict-related material damage and drop the simultaneous inclusion of the 
insignificant fatality indicator. Some of the previously insignificant control variables now 
become significant for specific branches, such as infrastructural development for finance, 
transport, and communication growth. Natural disasters have particular impact on the 
industrial sector, while services seem less severely affected. Neither economic growth nor 
conflicts in neighboring districts significantly influence domestic outcomes.  
The conflict coefficients confirm our expectations and existing empirical evidence from 
previous sector-specific analyses. We find particularly strong negative conflict effects for 
financial services, transport/communication branches, and manufacturing industries. 
Substantial and significantly negative coefficients are also reported for construction industries 
and the commerce sector, which includes retail, hotels, and restaurants. The mining and 
energy sectors, i.e. electricity, gas, and water supply, appear unaffected. The only sub-
category of the tertiary sector with an insignificant conflict coefficient is the area of 
‘services’. As government expenditures for administration and defense constitute the bulk of 
this category, maintained or increased security spending might be a potential driver behind 
this result.  
                                                 
16 The Variance Inflation Factor (VIF), a simple measure to identify multicollinearity, is calculated and the 
results (VIF<2 for all explanatory variables) mitigate concerns of multicollinearity. 
 
21In the next step, we exploit some of the growth dynamics of violent conflict. Ceteris paribus, 
we split the indicator of relative physical destruction into ongoing and recently resolved 
conflicts. Table 6 presents the results from separate regressions on total, sectoral, and sub-
sectoral GDP growth. As the general regression setup has not changed, the estimates for the 
control variables resemble those obtained in previous regressions and are therefore not 
discussed further here.  
Focusing on the estimated growth effects of ongoing and recent conflicts, we find clear-cut 
differences. For most sectors, results point to a considerably stronger decline in growth rates 
during ongoing conflicts than indicated by the singular indicator of conflict previously used. 
In particular, the construction and transport/communication sectors seem to suffer most 
during episodes of violence. Collapsing demand for buildings and infrastructure combined 
with an overall decrease in business transactions potentially deepens the crisis in these sectors 
during times of conflict. A relatively strong negative growth impact of conflict is also found 
for manufacturing and commerce industries, which is in line with both Collier’s (1999) 
concept of war vulnerability and existing evidence on the effects of violence on tourism and 
hospitality industries. 
Turning to the growth impact for resolved conflicts, the estimates are by far less substantial 
and significant. The only exception is the services sub-category: including, inter alia, 
government defense expenditures, this is possibly related to a post-conflict cutback in public 
spending on security. Marginally negative impacts of resolved conflicts are still found for the 
financial sector and manufacturing, which are assumed to be particularly dependent on a 
stable market environment. By contrast, the even insignificantly positive ‘post-war’ 
coefficients for construction and transport/communication industries seem related to public 
and private investment in reconstruction activities.  
 
Robustness Tests 
A series of alternative sub-samples and conflict coefficients are employed to test the 
robustness of our findings. As the regression set-up and the control variables remain 
unchanged, we only present the estimates for the conflict coefficients in what follows.
17 
First, the sample is restricted to rural areas, where, by far, most of the violence took place. 
                                                 
17 The complete set of regression results is available from the authors upon request. 
 
22The results, presented in Table 7a, are close to those for the whole sample: growth rates in the 
fields of transport/communication, construction, finance, and manufacturing are substantially 
affected during ongoing conflict. We find a marginally negative impact on commerce growth, 
while the positive post-conflict trend for the construction sector is strengthened. In addition, 
the results indicate negative conflict spillover effects on finance and transport/communication. 
While the transport sector relies, almost by definition, on cross-district activities, these results 
also suggest that trust and transactions in domestic financial markets are affected by 
neighboring conflicts. 
Second, we exclude observations from the province of Aceh, to see to what extent our 
findings are driven by the separatist conflict in this region (Table 7b). Once Aceh is excluded, 
the negative effects of conflict on the tertiary sector turns become less significant and are 
partly absorbed by the conflict spillover variables. The magnitude of the conflict coefficients, 
however, remains largely unchanged. Interestingly enough, the immediate recovery of the 
construction sector after the end of conflict is strongly supported here. This effect becomes 
even clearer when we instead exclude the islands of Maluku and Sulawesi and the associated 
ethno-communal conflicts (Table 7c). In line with the Collier’s (2009) characterization of the 
recovery process, we find the immediate post-conflict recovery efforts to center on the 
reconstruction of critical infrastructure. This trend is also supported by the substantially 
positive post-conflict growth estimate for the energy sector.  
Third, instead of conflict-related material damage, we use alternative indicators of conflict. 
Table 7d presents the estimates for the indicators of conflict fatalities. Interestingly enough, 
the distinction between ongoing and resolved conflicts reveal substantial and significantly 
negative effects of human losses for ongoing conflicts. Consistent with previous findings for 
conflict-related material damage, finance, transport/communication, construction, and 
manufacturing are the most negatively affected. The results for resolved conflicts further 
confirm the impression of distinctly different economic impacts at different stages of violent 
conflict. 
A second alternative indicator of conflict is the proportion of villages in a district that report 
incidences of conflict. Consistently, the coefficients are highly insignificant (Table 7e). As 
this indicator does not take into account the severity of violence, the mere existence of 
conflict seems to have no a priori impact on the economy. As claimed by related cross-
country studies, the intensity of conflict decisively determines the impact on the economy. 
This is also confirmed when using absolute numbers of material damage and fatalities instead 
 
23of relative indicators of physical destruction and human losses (Tables 7f and 7g). The results 
are largely in line with our previous findings and underscore the particular conflict 
vulnerability of the service sector.  
Finally, we repeat the main regressions with the original GDP data, without correcting for 
outliers in sub-sectoral growth rates. Results for the whole sample and the sub-sample of rural 
areas are presented in Table II.a and II.b of the Appendix, and confirm our main findings. 
Again, we repeat the analysis with the indicator of conflict fatalities (Table II.c in the 
Appendix) and obtain similar results. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The overall negative effect of violent conflict on economic outcomes is confirmed by a 
growing amount of literature. However, relatively little is known on sector-specific impacts of 
violence, as disaggregated GDP data is scarcely available from conflict-ridden countries. In 
this paper, we build on detailed, district-level, GDP data from Indonesia and on nationwide 
data on the occurrence of conflicts, which allows us to provide quantitative evidence on the 
vulnerability to conflict across different economic activities. 
We find significantly different effects of violent conflict across sectors. As proposed by 
Collier (1999), industries dependent on either capital or transaction are most vulnerable to 
conflict. In particular, this applies to manufacturing, finance, transport and communication, as 
well as the retail and hospitality industries. The construction sector suffers substantially 
during active conflicts, while a slightly positive trend is found in the early post-conflict 
period. Other sectors’ recovery appears less rapid; both manufacturing industries and the 
finance sector seem especially reliant on a lasting peace. 
As we do not control for saving rates, reduced investment is a potential driver of the economic 
downturn in times of conflict. Overall, the analysis points to only temporary, short term 
impact of violent conflict on economic growth. A limitation of this study is the intermittent 
character of the conflict data. Observations on conflict before and after the respective survey 
years are not available, which prevents us from conducting a more detailed analysis of the 
growth dynamics during conflict and in post-conflict times. Nevertheless, the findings point to 
substantial differences in the sector-specific impacts of violent conflict, with potentially 
important implications for the reconstruction process and future development.  
The state’s and other actors’ efforts to foster economic recovery in the post-conflict period 
 
24should be selective in the sense that they particularly target the most affected branches. The 
rebuilding of infrastructure, such as transportation and communication networks, seems 
crucial especially for manufacturing industries and logistics services. Further, restoring peace 
and security probably contributes most to the recovery of the financial and tourism sectors. 
Given the scarcity of public funds in the aftermath of conflict, consideration of the local 
economy’s structure and the varying needs across branches should guide and contribute to an 
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 Table 1: Summary Statistics  
Variable n  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
District GDP growth: Agriculture  1120  3.45  4.55  -40.49  37.33 
District GDP growth: Mining  1036  4.76  8.10  -48.49  48.32 
District GDP growth: Manufacturing  1118  4.42  5.09  -48.62  48.36 
District GDP growth: Energy  1115  6.70  7.32  -48.48  47.70 
District GDP growth: Construction  1115  6.69  6.55  -40.68  47.95 
District GDP growth: Industry  1123  4.78  5.21  -37.51  42.39 
District GDP growth: Commerce  1121  6.04  4.57  -43.13  43.54 
District GDP growth: Transport and Communication  1117  6.85  5.10  -27.69  46.59 
District GDP growth: Finance  1104  6.86  6.80  -40.48  46.72 
District GDP growth: Services (sub-category) 1110  5.66  4.85  -49.33  45.22 
District GDP growth: Services  1123  6.06  3.69  -41.56  34.81 
District GDP growth: Total  1123  4.75  3.45  -33.57  35.91 
Spillovers: weighted
* average agricultural growth  1123  3.65  2.20  -14.95  11.13 
Spillovers: weighted average industrial growth  1123  4.13  4.30  -31.47  31.57 




















Spillovers: weighted average total GDP growth  1123  4.23  2.74  -26.23  21.97 
Share of villages where electricity is available  1123  94.78  13.07  0.74  100 
Average level of education of village heads (1-6)  1123  4.30  0.71  1.45  6 
Population growth rate  1123  2.00  2.32  -4.83  14.77 
Share of villages with more than one ethnicity  1123 72.74 23.39 2.42  100 













Tsunami: number of new houses required (per 1,000 Inh.)  1123  0.046  0.614  0  13.66 
Share of villages affected by conflict  1123  0.044  0.062  0  0.72 
Share of villages affected by violent conflict
** 1123  0.029  0.040  0  0.38 
Fatalities per 1,000 inhabitants 1123  0.015  0.138  0  2.86 
Fatalities per 1,000 inhabitants (resolved conflicts)  1123  0.008  0.080  0  1.92 
Fatalities per 1,000 inhabitants (ongoing conflicts) 1123  0.007  0.095  0  2.78 
Material damage as .01 %-share of GDP  1123  0.050  0.342  0  6.98 
Material damage as .01 %-share of GDP (resolved conflicts)  1123  0.031  0.201  0  5.19 
Material damage as .01 %-share of GDP (ongoing conflicts)  1123  0.019  0.225  0  6.64 













Spillovers: material damage as .01 %-share of GDP  1123  0.041  0.224  0  4.93 
*  The average neighboring growth rate ng for sector s in district i is equal to the sum of the growth rates gn,s in the neighboring districts 
























Table 2: Violent Conflict – Descriptive Statistics 
CONFLICT INDICES  2002 2005 2008 
 
Total 
Share of villages affected by conflict (%)  7.2  2.7  3.2 
Share of villages affected by violent conflict (%)  4.4  2.1  2.3 
Number of fatalities   4,858  276  335 
Material damage (million of Rupiah)  740,560  97,742  8,476 
 
District Means 
Number of fatalities   13.0  0.7  0.9 
Material damage (million of Rupiah)  2,054  260  23 
Fatalities per 1,000 inhabitants  0.042 0.002 0.002 
Material damage as .01 %-share of GDP  0.132  0.016  0.002 
 
 
Table 3: Districts most affected by violence 
(A)  Province  District  Fatalities 
per Capita  (B)  Province  District  Mat. Damage 
(Share GDP) 
(1)  NAD Aceh  Timur  2.86  (1)  NAD Aceh  Timur  6.98 
(8)  NAD  Aceh Tengah  2.08  (4)  Sulawesi Tengah  Poso  6.65 
(22)  Maluku Utara  Halmahera Barat  1.97  (16)  Maluku  Pulau Buru  3.99 
(2) Sulawesi  Tengah  Poso  1.39  (11)  NAD  Kota Langsa  1.51 
(91) Maluku  Kota Ambon  1.24 (244)  Jambi  Kerinci  1.48 
(71) NAD  Aceh  Selatan  0.77  (47)  Sulawesi Selatan  Mamuju  1.25 
(15)  NAD  Aceh Barat Daya  0.63 (220)  Jambi  Merangin  1.24 
(249)  NAD Aceh  Besar  0.34  (2)  NAD Aceh  Tengah  1.21 
(12) NTT  Rote  Ndao  0.30  (29)  NTB  Dompu  1.13 
(95) NAD  Aceh  Utara  0.26  (44) Maluku  Maluku  Tenggara  1.07 
(4) NAD  Kota Langsa  0.25 (411)  Sulawesi  Selatan  Kota Palopo  1.07 
(346)  NAD  Nagan Raya  0.22  (9)  NTT  Rote Ndao  1.02 
(346) NAD  Aceh  Barat  0.20 (411)  Jambi  Bungo  1.01 
(47) Kalimantan  Tengah Kotawaringin Barat  0.18  (21)  NAD  Pidie  1.01 
(346) Papua  Puncak  Jaya  0.17  (7)  NAD  Aceh Barat Daya  1.00 
(3)  Maluku Pulau  Buru  0.17  (98)  Maluku Maluku  Tengah 0.96 
(32) Maluku  Maluku  Tengah  0.16  (23) Sulawesi  Selatan  Luwu  0.88 
(234) NAD  Kota Lhokseumawe  0.15 (64)  NAD  Aceh  Tamiang  0.84 
(80) NAD  Bireuen  0.13  (343) NTB  Lombok  Tengah  0.81 
(103) NAD  Aceh  Singkil  0.12  (47)  Sulawesi Tenggara  Muna  0.75 
Fatalities: conflict-related fatalities per 1,000 inhabitants. Material damage as .01%-Share of Total District GDP. 
All observations from 2002 (observations from 2005 underlined). Urban districts in italic.  
In parentheses: ‘rank’ of the district in terms of material damage (A) and fatalities (B), respectively. 
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Figure 2: Distribution of Violence in 2002 [intended for color reproduction on the web and in print] 
a) Fatalities per Capita 





Table 4: Base FE Regression Results 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  Dependent Variable: 
GDP Growth  Agricult.  Industry  Services  Total 
0.06 0.01 -0.05  -0.08 
Population Growth Rate 
(0.08) (0.09) (0.06) (0.07) 
-0.05 0.11 0.08 0.05 
Availability of Electricity 
(0.05) (0.07) (0.05) (0.05) 
0.84 1.44** -0.06 0.83** 
Av. Education of Village Heads 
(0.69) (0.59) (0.35) (0.36) 
0.03* 0.01  0.00  0.01 
Ethnic Diversity 
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) 
0.83 -0.69 -0.19 0.31 
Natural Disaster Occurred 
(0.65) (0.87) (0.65) (0.44) 
-2.93*** -1.45*  -0.61  -1.52***
Tsunami: Physical Destruction 
(0.58) (0.75) (0.48) (0.47) 
-0.09 -0.08 -0.03 0.02  Average Neighboring Growth: 
Total GDP  (0.08) (0.14) (0.06) (0.10) 
-0.17 -1.63**  -0.69**  -0.85**  Conflict: Material Damage  
(% GDP)  (0.43) (0.76) (0.31) (0.35) 
0.10 0.12 -1.15  -0.97 
Conflict: Fatalities per Capita 
(0.90) (1.57) (1.02) (0.84) 
-0.70 0.99 -0.23 0.43  Spillover: Conflict in 
Neighboring Districts   (0.62) (1.24) (0.98) (0.54) 
0.29 1.48***  0.96***  1.06*** 
Time Dummy: Year 2005 
(0.45) (0.33) (0.30) (0.21) 
0.60 1.55***  1.60***  1.16*** 
Time Dummy: Year 2008 
(0.41) (0.44) (0.30) (0.23) 
2.61 -13.03* -2.13  -5.01 
Constant 
(6.11) (7.83) (5.71) (4.83) 
Observations 1120  1123  1123  1123 
R-squared 0.19  0.11  0.11  0.17 
No. of Groups  375  375  375  375 
Av. Obs. per Group  2.99  2.99  2.99  2.99 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
Conflict Indices: Fatalities per 1,000 Inhabitants.  





Table 5: Regressions Results for Sub-sectors  




Mining  Manufact.  Energy  Construct.  Commerce  Transport  Finance  Services 
0.00 0.08 -0.02 0.14 0.01 0.01 0.04 -0.07 
Population Growth Rate 
(0.15) (0.06) (0.15) (0.13) (0.08) (0.08) (0.12) (0.09) 
0.17*  0.08 0.02 0.08 0.07  0.13**  0.29***  0.01 
Availability of Electricity 
(0.10) (0.06) (0.12) (0.10) (0.06) (0.06) (0.09) (0.06) 
-0.29 1.44*** 0.06 2.25*** 0.45  -0.47  -0.40  -0.24 
Av. Education of Village Heads 
(1.10) (0.42) (0.80) (0.75) (0.50) (0.55) (1.10) (0.58) 
0.01 -0.02  -0.06*  0.04 0.01 0.02 -0.01 -0.02 
Ethnic Diversity 
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) 
0.30  -1.81**  0.04 -0.38 -0.69 1.83 0.83 -1.50 
Natural Disaster Occurred 
(1.86) (0.83) (1.47) (1.17) (0.78) (1.14) (1.56) (1.01) 
-0.98 -2.02***  -1.11*** -1.28  -1.05*  -0.38  0.29  -0.54 
Tsunami: Physical Destruction 
(1.01) (0.32) (0.35) (0.94) (0.56) (0.72) (1.44) (0.62) 
-0.23 0.02  0.03 -0.15 -0.07 -0.06 -0.04 0.05  Average Neighboring Growth: 
Total GDP  (0.14) (0.14) (0.15) (0.14) (0.08) (0.07) (0.15) (0.07) 
-0.26  -1.46***  0.03  -1.22*  -0.78** -1.44** -1.63**  -0.37  Conflict: Material Damage  
(% GDP)  (0.41) (0.51) (0.49) (0.71) (0.38) (0.66) (0.67) (0.29) 
-0.81 1.35 -1.66 2.13 -1.08  -1.54*  0.88 0.62  Spillover: Conflict in 
Neighboring Districts   (0.78) (1.40) (1.21) (2.08) (1.21) (0.89) (2.12) (1.39) 
0.98 1.18***  -1.15*  1.49***  1.58*** -0.19  0.12  0.56 
Time Dummy: Year 2005 
(0.72) (0.30) (0.60) (0.48) (0.38) (0.39) (0.79) (0.50) 
0.98 1.69*** -1.14 1.86***  1.77*** 0.67 1.85***  1.73*** 
Time Dummy: Year 2008 
(0.79) (0.44) (0.71) (0.61) (0.43) (0.48) (0.67) (0.50) 
-10.50 -8.45  9.69 -14.22 -3.70  -5.67  -19.10* 7.12 
Constant 
(11.24) (6.52) (11.23)  (10.40) (6.83)  (7.29)  (9.95)  (6.94) 
Observations  1036 1118 1115 1115 1121 1117 1104 1110 
R-squared  0.04 0.13 0.02 0.07 0.09 0.10 0.08 0.04 
No. of Groups  354 375 375 375 375 375 375 375 
Av. Obs. per Group  2.93 2.98 2.97 2.97 2.99 2.98 2.94 2.96 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
Conflict Index: Material Damage as 0.01 %-Points of Total District GDP. 
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Table 6: Regression Results – Resolved vs. Ongoing Conflicts 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)  Dep. Var: 
GDP Growth  Agricult.  Mining  Manufact.  Energy  Construct. Industry Commerce Transport Finance  Services  Service  Total 
0.06 -0.00 0.08 -0.02 0.13 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.04 -0.07  -0.05  -0.08  Population Growth 
Rate  (0.08) (0.15) (0.06) (0.15) (0.13) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.12) (0.09) (0.06) (0.07) 
-0.05  0.17*  0.08 0.02 0.08 0.11 0.07  0.13**  0.29***  0.01 0.08 0.05  Availability of 
Electricity  (0.05) (0.10) (0.06) (0.12) (0.10) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.09) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) 
0.85 -0.30  1.44***  0.06  2.21***  1.42**  0.44 -0.49 -0.40 -0.23 -0.07  0.81**  Av. Education of 
Village Heads  (0.69) (1.10) (0.42) (0.81) (0.74) (0.59) (0.50) (0.55) (1.10) (0.58) (0.34) (0.36) 
0.03*  0.01 -0.02  -0.06*  0.04 0.01 0.01 0.02 -0.01  -0.02 0.00 0.01 
Ethnic Diversity 
(0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) 
0.83  0.24  -1.81**  0.03 -0.39 -0.69 -0.69 1.83  0.83 -1.50 -0.21 0.30  Natural Disaster 
Occurred  (0.65) (1.87) (0.83) (1.47) (1.17) (0.87) (0.78) (1.14) (1.56) (1.01) (0.65) (0.44) 
-2.94*** -0.98 -2.02***  -1.10*** -1.27  -1.44*  -1.05*  -0.37  0.29  -0.55  -0.60 -1.51*** Tsunami: Physical 
Destruction  (0.58) (1.00) (0.32) (0.34) (0.94) (0.75) (0.56) (0.72) (1.44) (0.62) (0.48) (0.47) 
-0.09 -0.23 0.02  0.04 -0.09 -0.03 -0.06 -0.02 -0.04 0.03 -0.04 0.04  Average Neighboring 
Growth: Total GDP  (0.08) (0.14) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.14) (0.09) (0.07) (0.17) (0.07) (0.06) (0.10) 
-0.40 0.36 -1.36 0.17 1.06 0.04 -0.42 0.20 -1.44  -1.01***  -0.68*  0.12  Resolved Conflict: 
Material Damage   (0.60) (0.69) (0.95) (1.05) (0.89) (0.62) (0.41) (0.33) (0.89) (0.34) (0.35) (0.37) 
0.07 -1.75  -1.58**  -0.13  -3.22*** -3.05*** -1.10  -2.92*** -1.79 0.19  -1.26**  -2.16*** Ongoing Conflict: 
Material Damage   (0.46) (1.50) (0.65) (0.69) (0.78) (0.52) (0.68) (0.40) (1.44) (0.34) (0.59) (0.33) 
-0.75 -0.55 1.38 -1.62 2.67 1.39 -1.00 -1.15 0.93 0.48 -0.23 0.65  Spillover: Conflict in 
Neighboring Districts  (0.64) (0.93) (1.46) (1.26) (2.14) (1.29) (1.23) (0.92) (2.16) (1.35) (0.97) (0.55) 
0.28  1.01  1.19***  -1.15*  1.58*** 1.55*** 1.60***  -0.12  0.13  0.53  0.98*** 1.12***  Time Dummy: Year 
2005  (0.45) (0.73) (0.30) (0.60) (0.48) (0.33) (0.38) (0.39) (0.79) (0.49) (0.29) (0.21) 
0.59  1.02  1.69***  -1.14  1.94*** 1.61*** 1.78***  0.72  1.85*** 1.71*** 1.61*** 1.20***  Time Dummy: Year 
2008  (0.41) (0.80) (0.44) (0.71) (0.60) (0.44) (0.42) (0.48) (0.67) (0.50) (0.29) (0.23) 
2.67 -10.40 -8.46  9.65 -14.58  -13.35*  -3.77 -5.97  -19.14*  7.25  -2.29 -5.34 
Constant 
(6.10) (11.23) (6.55) (11.20)  (10.41) (7.80)  (6.84)  (7.31)  (9.97)  (6.93)  (5.72)  (4.82) 
Observations  1120 1036 1118 1115 1115 1123 1121 1117 1104 1110 1123 1123 
R-squared  0.19 0.04 0.13 0.02 0.08 0.11 0.09 0.10 0.08 0.04 0.11 0.17 
No. of Groups  375 354 375 375 375 375 375 375 375 375 375 375 
Av. Obs. per Group  2.99 2.93 2.98 2.97 2.97 2.99 2.99 2.98 2.94 2.96 2.99 2.99 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
Conflict Index: Material Damage as 0.01 %-Points of Total District GDP. 
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Table 7: Robustness Tests  
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)  Dep. Var: 
GDP Growth  Agricult.  Mining  Manufact.  Energy  Construct. Industry Commerce Transport Finance  Services  Service  Total 
1SPATIAL SUB-SAMPLES 
a. Rural Areas 
-0.41 0.51 -1.54 0.33 1.25 0.05 -0.42 0.46 -1.30  -1.29***  -0.70*  -0.07  Resolved Conflict: 
Material Damage  (0.50) (0.78) (1.04) (1.18) (0.84) (0.51) (0.46) (0.36) (0.81) (0.40) (0.40) (0.29) 
-0.06 -1.84  -1.28**  -0.22  -2.89*** -2.73*** -1.15  -3.20*** -1.86* 0.52  -1.25**  -1.95*** Ongoing Conflict: 
Material Damage   (0.49) (1.76) (0.61) (0.82) (0.71) (0.48) (0.71) (0.40) (1.04) (0.49) (0.62) (0.32) 
-0.92 -0.37 2.17 -2.43 3.61 1.78 -1.72  -2.16**  -2.10*  1.66 -0.35 0.50  Spillover: Conflict in 
Neighboring Districts  (0.85) (1.12) (1.83) (1.57) (2.92) (1.71) (1.79) (0.99) (1.12) (1.85) (1.45) (0.72) 
 
b. Exclusion of NAD 
0.43 0.96 -0.80 1.10 2.67* 0.56 -0.12 0.23  -2.33***  -0.31 -0.43 0.20  Resolved Conflict: 
Material Damage  (0.90) (0.88) (1.04) (1.19) (1.54) (0.86) (0.55) (0.62) (0.89) (0.56) (0.44) (0.62) 
-3.22  -4.03*  -2.80  -5.24** -8.03** -4.45**  -1.68  -3.15  2.34  -1.46  -1.36  -2.35  Ongoing Conflict: 
Material Damage   (2.34) (2.30) (2.77) (2.63) (3.33) (2.14) (1.18) (2.16) (1.98) (1.57) (1.35) (1.63) 
-0.59  -1.84  -0.53  0.42  -0.67  -1.03  -1.74* -1.42* -1.95* -1.34*  -1.68** -0.59  Spillover: Conflict in 
Neighboring Districts  (0.91) (1.28) (0.88) (1.22) (0.85) (0.82) (1.02) (0.75) (1.07) (0.73) (0.81) (0.62) 
 
c. Exclusion of Sulawesi and the Moluccas 
-0.06 0.47  -3.77***  4.39**  4.39***  0.05 -1.23 -1.22 -3.23  -1.84*  -1.96**  -0.56  Resolved Conflict: 
Material Damage  (0.64) (1.58) (1.45) (2.18) (1.65) (1.03) (1.15) (0.99) (2.60) (1.05) (0.99) (0.59) 
0.18  -3.10  -2.06**  0.43 -4.06*** -3.84*** -1.58**  -3.14*** -3.08*** -0.27 -1.80*** -2.80*** Ongoing Conflict: 
Material Damage   (0.37) (2.94) (0.96) (0.77) (0.99) (0.70) (0.74) (0.36) (1.16) (0.35) (0.52) (0.33) 
-1.00 1.19 2.93 -3.44 5.42 3.79*  -0.04 -0.68 4.29 1.75 1.08  2.15***  Spillover: Conflict in 
Neighboring Districts  (0.87) (1.67) (2.39) (2.29) (3.32) (1.96) (2.07) (1.45) (2.66) (2.47) (1.65) (0.73) 
1ALTERNATIVE CONFLICT INDICATORS 
c. Fatalities per Capita 
-1.88*  -3.48 0.14 8.09 0.40 1.62 -1.28 0.90 1.26 -2.11  -0.96 0.30  Resolved Conflict: 
Fatalities  (1.01) (2.31) (1.40) (7.36) (1.70) (1.24) (1.29) (1.20) (2.62) (1.31) (0.95) (0.95) 
0.93  2.61 -2.97** -4.76  -4.20*  -6.23*** -2.25 -4.91**  -7.88***  -0.12 -3.17**  -4.53*** Ongoing Conflict: 
Fatalities   (0.78) (3.04) (1.19) (4.51) (2.25) (1.55) (1.79) (2.33) (1.57) (1.43) (1.58) (1.35) 
-0.63 0.40 1.82 2.06 3.84 3.13  -3.37*  -2.66*  1.55 1.50 -0.82 1.10  Spillover: Conflict in 
Neighboring Districts  (1.21) (1.70) (3.09) (6.07) (3.97) (2.47) (1.89) (1.38) (3.58) (2.40) (1.64) (1.27) 
 
e. Share of Villages Affected by Conflict 
0.57 0.69 0.30 0.86 0.58 0.54 -0.02  -0.24  -0.17  -0.17  -0.15 0.34  Resolved Conflict: 
Fatalities  (0.47) (0.82) (0.51) (0.80) (0.63) (0.49) (0.35) (0.41) (0.61) (0.47) (0.26) (0.31) 
0.31 -0.54 0.28 -1.55 0.61 -0.55 -1.48 -1.45 -2.30 0.11 -0.98 -0.51  Ongoing Conflict: 
Fatalities   (0.35) (0.84) (1.31) (1.30) (2.12) (1.45) (0.94) (1.15) (1.62) (0.82) (0.87) (0.91) 
0.08  0.72  0.38  -0.18  0.54 0.93** 0.12  0.16  0.29  -0.28 -0.05  0.49  Spillover: Conflict in 
Neighboring Districts  (0.31) (0.57) (0.50) (0.56) (0.46) (0.47) (0.32) (0.42) (0.64) (0.47) (0.30) (0.31) 
 
f. Material Damage – Absolute Values 
-0.48 0.40 0.37 0.37 1.02 0.69 -0.29  -0.23  -1.64***  -1.18***  -0.66**  0.08  Resolved Conflict: 
Material Damage  (0.48) (1.26) (1.06) (0.81) (1.04) (0.80) (0.32) (0.39) (0.54) (0.37) (0.25) (0.56) 
0.19  -3.33 -0.65*** -0.04 -1.29*** -1.44*** -0.80*** -1.50*** -1.34*** 0.16 -0.80*** -1.09*** Ongoing Conflict: 
Material Damage   (0.13) (2.57) (0.22) (0.24) (0.22) (0.21) (0.13) (0.12) (0.33) (0.12) (0.11) (0.15) 
-0.50 0.70 1.01 -1.00 1.80 1.15 -0.38 -0.50 0.99 0.29 -0.00 0.52  Spillover: Conflict in 
Neighboring Districts  (0.33) (0.76) (0.95) (0.79) (1.36) (0.84) (0.74) (0.54) (1.20) (0.87) (0.58) (0.34) 
 
g. Fatalities – Absolute Numbers 
-0.37 -0.84** 0.31  2.61**  0.04 0.52***  -0.39** 0.26  0.46  -0.27  -0.21  0.06  Resolved Conflict: 
Fatalities  (0.23) (0.40) (0.21) (1.08) (0.37) (0.20) (0.18) (0.16) (0.44) (0.25) (0.16) (0.16) 
0.23  0.14 -0.86*** -1.36  -1.24*  -1.95*** -1.00*** -1.86*** -2.37*** -0.14 -1.21*** -1.50*** Ongoing Conflict: 
Fatalities   (0.22) (1.31) (0.29) (1.21) (0.64) (0.38) (0.35) (0.43) (0.37) (0.39) (0.26) (0.29) 
-0.24 0.30 0.23 1.23 0.73 0.67  -0.82**  -0.61*  0.33 0.26 -0.28 0.16  Spillover: Conflict in 
Neighboring Districts  (0.22) (0.33) (0.74) (1.52) (1.00) (0.59) (0.39) (0.32) (0.85) (0.50) (0.34) (0.33) 
Each pair of coefficients from a different regression (control variables as in Table 5). 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
Conflict Indices: a) relative: Fatalities per 1,000 Inhabitants. Material Damage as 0.01 %-Points of Total District GDP.  
b) absolute: Number of Fatalities (in 100 deaths). Material Damage (in 1 billion Rupiah).  
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APPENDIX 
Table I: Structure of the GDP Data 



































Oil & Gas Manufacturing 
 - Petroleum Refinery 
 - Liquefied Natural Gas 
Non Oil & Gas Manufacturing 
 - Food, Beverage & Tobacco 
 - Textile, Leather Products & Footwear 
 - Wood Products & Forest Products 
 - Paper 
 - Fertilizer, Chemicals & Rubber Products 
 - Cements and Non-metal Quarrying Products 
 - Iron & Steel 
 - Transport. Vehicle, Machinery & Equipment 
Manufacturing 

























Large Trade & Retail 







 - Railway Transport 
 - Road Transport 
 - Sea Water Transport 
 - Inland Water Transport 
 - Air Transport 
 - Transportation Supporting  
Communication 
 - Post and Telecommunication 
Transport & 
Communication 






Non-banking Financial Institution 
Financial Supporting  








 - Government Administration & Defense 
 - Other Government Services 
Private 
 - Social Community 
















† Percentage share of total (rural) GDP.   
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Table II: Unchanged GDP Data  
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)  Dep. Var: 
GDP Growth  Agricult.  Mining  Manufact.  Energy  Construct. Industry Commerce Transport Finance  Services  Service  Total 
 
a. All Areas 
-0.74 -6.92 -1.54 0.02 0.27 -1.25 -0.35 0.10 0.20 -2.66 -1.11 0.10  Resolved Conflict: 
Material Damage  (0.57) (5.76) (1.00) (1.14) (1.06) (1.65) (0.42) (0.42) (1.86) (3.52) (1.36) (0.68) 
0.23  7.82 -1.60** 0.21 -2.10** -2.07  -1.09  -2.45*** -0.23  -0.96 -1.62**  -3.79*** Ongoing Conflict: 
Material Damage   (0.55) (5.48) (0.67) (0.83) (0.90) (2.05) (0.66) (0.58) (3.52) (2.80) (0.79) (1.19) 
-0.91  -16.04  1.28 -2.11 -0.04 0.27 -1.05 -0.18  -10.51  -4.16 -1.05 2.47  Spillover: Conflict in 
Neighboring Districts  (0.90)  (16.33)  (1.46) (1.78) (2.52) (4.85) (1.21) (0.94)  (11.07)  (5.11) (1.76) (3.28) 
 
b. Rural Areas 
-0.90*  -7.07  -1.81* 0.06  0.50 -1.61 -0.37 0.20  2.82 -2.48 -1.02 -0.33  Resolved Conflict: 
Material Damage  (0.49) (5.82) (1.10) (1.22) (1.04) (2.10) (0.47) (0.47) (2.76) (3.75) (1.43) (0.82) 
0.10  7.95  -1.29*  0.29 -1.99** -1.35  -1.13  -2.55*** -3.00  -1.30 -1.73**  -3.31*** Ongoing Conflict: 
Material Damage   (0.58) (5.19) (0.67) (0.95) (0.90) (2.44) (0.70) (0.58) (2.21) (3.06) (0.88) (1.16) 
-1.32  -19.51  2.00 -3.38 0.13 1.07 -1.77 -0.38  -18.10  -6.99 -1.99 3.10  Spillover: Conflict in 
Neighboring Districts  (1.16)  (22.69)  (1.85) (2.38) (3.54) (6.88) (1.77) (1.34)  (14.31)  (7.19) (2.57) (4.56) 
 
c. Fatalities per Capita 
-1.33 -1.21 -0.30 8.23 1.23 2.82*  -1.00 1.68 3.35 -4.06 -1.60 1.68  Resolved Conflict: 
Fatalities  (1.19) (2.39) (1.61) (7.24) (1.49) (1.68) (1.29) (1.30) (3.50) (4.62) (1.53) (1.52) 
1.30  14.10**  -2.09  -2.96  -3.67*  -2.05  -3.08** -4.78** -11.19*  -0.80  -3.40* -6.32*** Ongoing Conflict: 
Fatalities   (0.94) (6.40) (1.63) (4.29) (2.18) (2.40) (1.53) (2.23) (5.98) (6.85) (1.91) (1.62) 
-1.02 -11.87 0.80  -0.14  0.60  2.10 -3.30* -1.13 -15.21  -28.39*  -7.55* 2.13  Spillover: Conflict in 
Neighboring Districts  (1.58)  (16.32)  (3.04) (7.29) (4.23) (7.98) (1.96) (1.35)  (19.19)  (16.72)  (4.23) (5.87) 
Each pair of coefficients from a different regression (control variables as in Table 5). 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
Conflict Indices: Fatalities per 1,000 Inhabitants. Material Damage as 0.01 %-Points of Total District GDP. 
 